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Abstract. Driven by a concern about the negative side effects of ethnic concentration 
neighbourhoods, many European governments aim to create more ethnically and socio-
economically mixed neighbourhoods. At the same time, housing policy aims to give tenants 
more choice in how and where they live. The objectives of these two policies might conflict as 
offering people choice has the potential to increase self-segregation, especially across ethnic 
groups. This paper studies the effect of choice-based letting on (self) segregation in housing 
association stock in England. We analyse whether households who let their property under 
choice-based letting end up in neighbourhoods with different levels of ethnic concentrations 
than households who are matched to a dwelling using the traditional allocation system. We 
focus on how the effect of choice-based letting differs for ethnic minority households and non-
ethnic minority households. Using unique data on all lettings made in the housing association 
sector in England in 2006/2007 and an ordered logit regression model we show that ethnic 
minority households are more likely to let a property in an ethnic concentration neighbourhood 
than non-ethnic minority households. Ethnic minorities letting their property under choice-
based letting are the most likely to accept a dwelling in an ethnic concentration neighbourhood. 
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Introduction 
 
Segregation along ethnic or socio-economic lines is considered to be problematic for a variety 
of reasons, not least because of the potential for segregation to cause and reinforce social 
exclusion (Pawson & Kintrea, 2002). Segregation may prevent individuals from accessing 
better employment, housing or other social opportunities, hindering the improvement of 
personal circumstances (see Dekker & Rowlands, 2005, p.111). At the macro level, segregation 
can hinder the development of a multicultural society by facilitating resentment and mistrust 
between different communities in society. A report into public disorder in cities and towns in 
Northern England during 2001 concluded that one of the major causes of the violence was “the 
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fragmentation and polarisation of communities – on economic, geographical, racial and 
cultural lines – on a scale which amounts to segregation, albeit to an extent by choice” 
(Denham, 2001, p.8). 
The British Government has expressed a particular concern with regard to the 
concentration of ethnic minorities in social housing in England (Independent Review Team, 
2001; Commission for Racial Equality, 1990; 2004; Cabinet Office, 2003; Home Office 2001). 
Burrows (1999) found that ethnic minorities are overrepresented in social housing: of the non-
ethnic population 11% are housed in the social sector while the equivalent figure for ethnic 
minorities is 19%. These averages hide substantial regional variations. In London, for instance, 
over 31% of all ethnic minorities lived in social housing. The social housing sector in England 
has been progressively reduced over the last 20 years, and currently comprises only 18% of the 
total housing stock (SEH, 2007). Most of the more desirable stock has been sold to sitting 
tenants under the right to buy and rates of new construction are at historically low levels 
(Pawson & Watkins, 2007). The outcome of these processes has been the residualisation of the 
remaining stock which is frequently maligned as the “tenure of last resort” for those who are 
unable to afford home ownership (Taylor, 1998). The shrinking of the social sector has reduced 
the choice for households requiring social housing which is likely to affect the ethnic minority 
population more than the white population. Clapham and Kintrea (1984) already noted that 
socio-economic groups are not randomly distributed in social housing with the worst off and 
ethnic minorities frequently accessing the worst housing and neighbourhoods. 
To reduce the negative effects of segregation on individuals and society the British 
Government set out to create more ethnically and socio-economically mixed neighbourhoods 
(see for instance DETR, 2000a; ODPM, 2005). The social sector can play a crucial role in this 
objective as it is one of the few sectors of the housing market where the government can 
directly influence outcomes. Creating mixed neighbourhoods requires government intervention 
through housing policy by either influencing neighbourhood tenure mix – mixing owners and 
renters – or by influencing the ethnic and socio-economic mix of tenants in social housing 
through the allocation system of social housing (Bolt et al., 2008; Van Daalen & Van der Land, 
2008). Purposely creating ethnically mixed neighbourhoods is controversial and may be 
associated with ideas of social engineering. Often governments use policies aimed at creating a 
socio-economic mix in an attempt to indirectly create ethnically mixed neighbourhoods (see 
Bolt et al., 2008). 
The Housing Green Paper, Quality and Choice: A decent home for all (DETR, 2000b) 
placed choice at the centre of British housing policy. The introduction of choice-based letting 
in 2001 was designed to empower people in social housing to make decisions over how and 
where they live (DETR, 2000b, Brown & Yates, 2005; Brown & King, 2005). Choice-based 
letting allows applicants to bid on properties of their ‘choice’ instead of being allocated to a 
dwelling by a housing officer (Kullberg, 1997; 2002). The objectives of policies to create 
socially mixed neighbourhoods and policies to give people more choice on the housing market 
are potentially contradictory. Concerns have been expressed that offering people choice in 
residential locations through choice-based letting has the potential to increase self-segregation 
along ethnic lines (ODPM, 2004; CLG, 2006; Pawson & Watkins, 2007). It is well established 
that there are differences between ethnic groups in the desired ethnic mix of the 
neighbourhoods in which they live. Over time, these (sometimes small) differences can lead to 
marked patterns of ethnic segregation (Schelling, 1969, 1971; see Clark, 1991 for the US; Van 
Ham & Feijten, 2008 for the Netherlands). 
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Currently, very little is known about consumer responses to choice-based lettings (see 
Kullberg, 2002 for the Netherlands) and choice-based letting outcomes in terms of their spatial 
or distributional effects (Pawson & Watkins, 2007). A report commissioned by the Department 
of Communities and Local Government (CLG, 2006) Monitoring the Longer Term Impact of 
Choice Based Lettings concluded that there is no evidence that choice-based letting had 
resulted in greater ethnic segregation. It was also reported that choice-based letting appears to 
produce a more spatially dispersed rather than concentrated pattern of lettings to ethnic 
minority households. In a paper based on the same 13 case studies, Pawson and Watkins 
(2007) state that the above conclusions possibly do not reflect experiences of all British social 
landlords using choice-based letting (Pawson & Watkins, 2007). The study reported in this 
paper aims to give a more complete picture of the effect of choice-based letting on (self) 
segregation in housing association stock in England. We analyse whether households who let 
their property under choice-based letting end up in neighbourhoods with different levels of 
ethnic concentrations than households who are matched to a dwelling using non-choice-based 
letting systems. Special attention is paid to how the effect of choice-based letting differs for 
ethnic minority households and non-ethnic minority households. We use unique data on all 
lettings made in the housing association sector in England in 2006/2007 collected for the 
Housing Corporation and model the effect of ethnicity and choice-based letting on the type of 
destination neighbourhood using an ordered logit model. 
 
 
Background and literature review 
 
There is a heated debate on whether the rise in the percentage of ethnic minorities in Great 
Britain (increasing from 6% of the total population in 1991 to almost 9% in 2001, Sabater, 
2008) has led to an increase in residential segregation along ethnic lines (see Robinson, 2007 
for a review of ethnic segregation literature). Champion (1996), using the 1991 Census, 
showed that in England ethnic minorities are spatially dispersed and that areas with the highest 
concentrations of ethnic minorities do not match the image of racialised ghettos as found in the 
USA (see also Peach, 1996; Johnston et al., 2002). Using the 2001 Census, Johnston (2006, p. 
988) confirmed the pattern of ethnic dispersion observed in 1991 but also noted that there are 
“distinct ethnic Enclaves … not only of London and other large cities (especially 
Birmingham), but also of a number of other urban centres”. In an analysis combining both the 
1991 and the 2001 Census, Dorling and Rees (2003; 2004) and Dorling and Thomas (2004), 
demonstrated that “while many aspects of society in the UK became more polarised 
geographically over the course of the 1990s, this was generally not the case for people’s 
ethnicity” (Dorling & Thomas, 2004, p.36). In an in-depth demographic analysis of Bradford – 
one of the cities of Northern England that experienced race riots in 2001 – Simpson (2004) 
concurred with the overall pattern of stable levels of segregation as identified in the 1991 and 
2001 Census analyses. However, Simpson did highlight some significant changes in local 
levels of segregation and identified that the driver behind these changes was natural population 
growth in the South Asian community. 
A report commissioned to investigate the causes of the 2001 “Race Riots” described a 
much more ethnically segregated society than the census analyses and the demographic 
analysis of Bradford had identified, and suggested that ethnic concentration as a result of 
residential self-segregation was central to the tension and unrest (Robinson, 2007). The 
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Independent Review Team (2001, p. 9) highlighted that the “separate educational 
arrangements, community and voluntary bodies, employment, places of worship, language, 
social and cultural networks means that many communities operate on the basis of a series of 
parallel lives”. The report criticised the role played by Housing Policy and housing provision in 
creating segregated communities noting that, in many cases, the segregation was self enforced 
with ethnic minorities choosing to live in communities comprised predominantly of people of 
the same ethnicity. To avoid a repeat of the 2001 riots, the reports promoted the creation of 
ethnically mixed communities (DETR, 2000a; ODPM, 2005). 
Around the same time of the race riots report, the British Government started to 
promote housing choice for those in the social housing sector (DETR, 2000b). Prior to 2001 
social housing in England was exclusively allocated using waiting lists, and households were 
matched to suitable properties by social housing providers. Housing needs and the priority 
levels of applicants were assessed using points or category based systems (Pawson & Watkins, 
2007). Housing officers used the outcome of the assessment to match households with 
available properties (in certain neighbourhoods). Whilst it was possible to turn down 
properties, refusal usually led to penalties such as temporary suspension from the housing 
waiting list (Pawson & Watkins, 2007) or exclusion through one-offer-only policies (Pawson 
& Kintrea, 2002). As a result, those most in need – often ethnic minorities – ended up 
concentrated in the least desirable dwellings and neighbourhoods (Clapham & Kintrea, 1984). 
The housing allocation system has been linked to current patterns of ethnic segregation as 
allocation practices from as far back as the 1950s intentionally and unintentionally promoted 
segregated outcomes (Peach, 1996; Somerville 2001). Discriminatory practices based on class 
and race were found to be part of the day-to-day working practice of housing officers (Malpass 
& Murie, 1994). Henderson and Karn (1984; 1987) found in their study of social housing 
access in Birmingham that housing officers used criteria such as whether applicants ‘deserve’ a 
house and neighbourhood, whether neighbours were likely to complain and whether applicants 
would lower the standard of the neighbourhood in order to match applicants to vacant 
dwellings. Generally, the system of allocation by scoring was seen as being property-led rather 
than applicant-led (Pawson & Kintrea, 2002, p.649). The allocation process was overly 
bureaucratic, lacked transparency and did not reflect the needs and preferences of the tenant as 
priorities (Clapham & Kintrea, 1991). 
The 2000 Housing Green Paper (DETR, 2000b) introduced the concept of choice in the 
social housing sector as part of a wider drive of welfare reforms aimed at empowering the users 
of public services (Pawson & Watkins, 2007). A choice-based letting system was proposed 
which was modelled on the ‘advert model’ or ‘supply model’ developed in the late 1980s in the 
city of Delft in the Netherlands (Kullberg, 1997, 2002). The system was designed to “open up 
the letting of social housing… [and] contrasted with traditional housing allocation systems 
where applicants are normally faced with only the stark choice of whether to accept or reject a 
property deemed ‘suitable’” (CLG, 2006, p.5). In the proposed choice-based letting system 
available housing is advertised, rather than allocated, and eligible households can ‘bid’ for 
properties. A variety of choice-based letting systems is operational using different forms of 
‘currency’ – such as points, waiting time or housing need bands – to rank bidders (ODPM, 
2004). Systems based on waiting time normally use some form of time-limited ‘priority cards’ 
for urgent (re)housing cases. It was thought that introducing choice-based letting would enable 
households in the social housing sector to access properties and locations that were more 
appropriate to their needs and in communities that they wished to live in. The Green Paper also 
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set out that more choice should facilitate increased mobility as well as making better use of the 
social housing stock. The introduction of choice would enable those in social housing to better 
take ‘ownership’ of the housing and residential neighbourhood choices and outcomes that they 
experienced. 
The introduction of choice-based letting while simultaneously seeking to create socially 
and ethnically mixed neighbourhoods creates a potential contradiction between policies. While 
the social housing sector needed to move away from meeting administrators’ perceived needs 
of people to meeting the aspirations of applicants (Hill, 2005), the government is increasingly 
concerned with the need to engineer more socially and ethnically cohesive communities 
(Robinson, 2007). A possible side-effect of offering tenants more choice in residential 
locations is increased self-segregation along socio-economic and ethnic lines. In two 
pioneering papers, Schelling (1969, 1971) suggested that a person’s choice of neighbourhood 
depends not only on the characteristics of the neighbourhood population, but also on the 
interaction between these and a person’s own characteristics. Schelling used this idea to 
explain segregation in the USA theoretically and postulated that even small differences 
between blacks and whites in preferences towards the race of their neighbours and consequent 
moving behaviour can cumulate in aggregate to highly segregated neighbourhoods (see also 
Clark, 1991; Van Ham & Feijten, 2008). Clark’s empirical examination of the Schelling 
hypothesis for the USA (1991) confirmed that the thesis is broadly correct, but that the 
differences in neighbourhood preferences between blacks and whites in the USA are 
significantly greater than those postulated by Schelling (see also other studies such as Clark, 
1992; 2002; Ihlanfeldt & Scafidi, 2002; Ioannides & Zabel, 2003). Using data from the 
Netherlands, Van Ham and Feijten (2008) and Van Ham and Clark (forthcoming) found that 
the native Dutch population is more likely to express a wish to leave ethnic concentration 
neighbourhoods, and to subsequently actually leave these neighbourhoods, than ethnic 
minorities themselves. In the Scottish context, Bowes and colleagues (1997) used interviews 
and concluded that members of the Pakistani community in Glasgow found the neighbourhood 
they lived in more important than their dwelling needs: they accepted poor quality housing 
because of the importance of living with co-ethnics in the same neighbourhood. 
 A government report (CLG, 2006), evaluating the spatial distributional effects of 
choice-based letting, concluded that there has not been an increase in ethnic segregation since 
the introduction of choice in the social sector as could be expected based on the work by 
Schelling (1969, 1971). The evaluation report shows a drop in the proportion of ethnic 
minorities moving into ethnic concentration neighbourhoods (defined as a neighbourhood with 
over twice the local ethnic minority average) which is interpreted as evidence of increased 
choice resulting in more ethnically mixed neighbourhoods (CLG, 2006). Based on a small 
number of case studies, the report concludes that “there is no evidence that [choice-based 
letting] has resulted in more ethnically polarized patterns of letting than those arising from 
previous lettings systems where decisions on which properties to offer to which applications 
were largely in the hands of landlord staff” (CLG, 2006, p.14; see also Pawson & Watkins, 
2007). The CLG report also recorded that there had been an increase in the number of moves 
made by ethnic minority households, noting that “by and large, social landlords who have 
introduced choice-based lettings have seen a rising proportion of their properties being let to 
minority ethnic households” (CLG, 2006, p.13). 
Although there seems to be agreement that levels of ethnic segregation in England have 
not increased in recent years, we cannot conclude that mechanisms of self-segregation are not 
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at work as even constant levels of segregation might point at mechanisms of self-segregation. 
Neighbourhoods are dynamic with households moving in and out over time. If levels of 
segregation have remained relatively constant and ethnic minority households have become 
more mobile this indicates that there are still processes at work ‘feeding’ ethnic minorities into 
ethnic concentration neighbourhoods. The introduction of choice-based letting could help to 
sustain current levels of segregation if ethnic minority groups choose to live in ethnic 
concentration neighbourhoods. In this paper we empirically investigate the effect of choice-
based letting on social housing allocation in England. Following the Schelling (1969, 1971) 
inspired literature we hypothesise that the choice-based letting system increases the probability 
that ethnic minorities select themselves into ethnic concentration neighbourhoods. 
It has been argued that the lack of real choice under choice-based letting, not self-
segregation by choice, might be a cause of sustained social and ethnic segregation in social 
housing. Brown and King (2005) state that choice in the context of choice-based lettings is a 
gift from the bureaucracy which controls it. Under choice-based letting, landlords set the rules 
of the game as applicants may only bid on property deemed suitable for their needs. Because 
applicants are deprived of control, choice-based letting ultimately fails to empower consumers 
of social housing (Brown & King, 2005). Having choice means being able to select a preferred 
option from distinctive alternatives. In social housing – a safety net for those without options – 
distinctive alternatives might not be available to the same extent as in, for example, health care 
or education. An essential prerequisite for rational choice satisfying housing desires is 
information (knowledge) about alternatives (see Elster, 1999 as in Brown & King, 2005). 
Some social housing applicants in choice-based letting will have more information than others 
and this will bias the allocation system in their favour (Brown & King, 2005). Research in the 
Netherlands by Kullberg (2002) showed that applicants with low incomes and those from 
ethnic minority groups (often overlapping groups) were more likely to lack understanding of 
the choice-based letting system and therefore fared less well in terms of housing outcomes. 
Also those with urgent or specific housing needs are likely to be disadvantaged in a choice-
based letting system as they will bid on the easiest-to-get dwelling which matches their needs 
which increases the likelihood to be accommodated in a less desirable area. As a result of the 
above, concerns have been expressed that the choice-based letting model might be detrimental 
to the interests of already disadvantaged groups (Pawson & Watkins, 2007). Ethnic minorities 
may end up in ethnic concentration neighbourhoods not as a result of choice, but as a result of 
a lack of choice – either because of a lack of knowledge or because of urgent housing needs. It 
has also been argued that ethnic minorities ‘choose’ ethnic concentration neighbourhoods 
because they want to avoid other areas known or perceived to suffer from racial tension (CLG, 
2006). 
 
 
Data and Methods 
 
The data used in this study were assembled from COntinuous REcording (CORE, 2007) which 
records information on the characteristics of both the household and the dwelling each time a 
letting of housing association property is made in England. All housing associations with more 
than 250 units or 250 bed spaces in England are required by the Housing Corporation to 
complete CORE logs fully and accurately. Social landlords that are smaller than 250 units or 
bed spaces, or not registered with the Housing Corporation but affiliated to the National 
 7 
Housing Federation are invited to complete CORE logs. CORE was launched in 1989 and 
around 600 housing associations are now recording more than 125,000 general needs lettings, 
90,000 supported housing lettings and 16,000 sales per year. The Centre for Housing Research 
(CHR) at the University of St Andrews has managed CORE since 1999. The CORE data is 
unique because it gives an up to date and detailed overview of almost all housing association 
lettings in England (so it is not a sample). In this paper we used information on 122,259 
2006/2007 lettings for which we have information on both the origin and destination Output 
Areas of tenants. Output Areas, containing on average 296 people, are the lowest spatial units 
for which aggregate level statistics are available in England. We linked the percentage of 
ethnic minorities in origin and destination Output Area to each letting record in our data. In this 
study we used Output Areas as a proxy for a household’s local neighbourhood. 
The dependent variable derived from the 2001 British Census
1
 (Office for National 
Statistics, 2001) measures the percentage of ethnic minorities in the destination output area in 
six categories: 0 to 2.5%; 2.5 to 5%; 5 to 10%; 10 to 20%; 20 to 40% and 40 to 100% (see 
descriptives in Table 1). Because the dependent variable is ordinal – a variable with more than 
two categories that can be ranked in a certain order, but without fixed intervals – we used 
ordered logit regression. This model is also known as the proportional odds model because the 
odds ratio of the event is independent of the relevant category. In ordered logit, a linear 
function is estimated of the independent variables and a set of cut points, which represent an 
underlying score (see Feijten & Mulder, 2005 for a housing related example). The coefficients 
of the independent variables can be interpreted as coefficients estimated in an ordinary logit 
model. Filling in the full regression equation produces a raw outcome value for each letting in 
the data. To evaluate the probability that a household moves into a property in one of the six 
categories of Output Areas (based on the percentage of ethnic minorities in the Output Area) 
one needs to calculate a probability for all six categories using the model outcome and the five 
cut points (identified as K1 to K5) produced by the model. For example, the probability to move 
into an Output Area with 0 to 2.5% ethnic minorities is: 
)exp(1
1
1Koutcome
P

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The probability of moving into an Output Area with 2.5 to 5%; 5 to 10%; 10 to 20%; and 20 to 
40% ethnic minorities is calculated using the following equation where Kn represents the cut 
point associated with the category in question: 
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The probability to move into Output Areas with 40-100% ethnic minorities is: 
)exp(1
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When combined the probabilities for all six categories will add up to 1, while the most likely 
destination neighbourhood will be identified as the one with the highest probability (see 
                                                 
1
 Census output is Crown copyright and is reproduced with the permission of the Controller of HMSO and the 
Queen's Printer for Scotland. 
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Menard, 2002). Because the models included both individual level characteristics and area 
level characteristics and the data included multiple individuals per Output Area, the standard 
errors have been adjusted for clustering of individuals on the area level to account for the non-
random distribution of individuals in neighbourhoods. 
 
--- Table 1 please around here --- 
 
Table 1 gives summary statistics of all independent variables used in the multivariate models. 
Note that we only use 121,065 lettings in our model due to a limited number of missing values 
on some of the variables used. Most variables were coded as dummies. Ethnic minority 
households were defined as households where the head does not belong to any of the following 
categories: White, White Irish or White Other. The White category includes heads of 
households born within the United Kingdom and the White Irish category includes heads of 
households born in the Irish Republic. The White Other category includes any other white 
heads of household. It is therefore diverse in composition including migrants from Europe, 
America, and Australasia. Ethnic minorities were coded as 1 and others were coded as 0. 
Employment status was measured in three categories: employed (reference category), 
unemployed, and other. Household composition was measured in four categories: single, single 
parent, two adult household with children, two adults without children (reference category), 
and other. Dummy variables were created for lettings made in Supported Housing, lettings 
made to households new to the housing association sector, lettings made in new stock (new 
compared to existing stock), and choice-based lettings. Age of the head of household was 
measured in years. The number of bedrooms in the property was not available for all Supported 
Housing properties. For the lettings where this information was missing, the average number of 
bedrooms was imputed which gives unbiased estimates (see Cohen & Cohen, 1975, chapter 7). 
Because the destination neighbourhood can not be seen in isolation from the 
neighbourhood of origin, we also included the percentage of ethnic minorities in the origin 
neighbourhood (in the same six categories as the dependent variable) as independent variable 
in the model (see Bolt & Van Kempen, 2002). The destination neighbourhood is characterised 
by the level of urbanism and whether (1) or not (0) the Output Area is located within the 
London Government Office Region (to account for the unique population and housing 
structures found in the capital city). The level of urbanism is measured using an ONS 
classification scheme which defines each output area into four settlement types: Urban, Small 
Town, Village, Dispersed Rural (Bibby & Shepherd, 2004). 
 
 
Results 
 
Before we discuss the results of the ordered logit regression we describe our data using origin-
destination matrices for the non-ethnic and ethnic populations (Tables 2a and 2b). The matrices 
show the percentage of households moving from each of the six types of neighbourhoods (by 
percentage of ethnic minorities) to each other type. Remember that we are using flow data as 
all households in the data (lettings in housing association stock) have moved. The general 
picture from both matrices is that most households move into neighbourhoods with the same 
percentage of ethnic minorities as the neighbourhood from which they came (see the 
percentages on the diagonal). This is as expected from the mobility literature (see for instance 
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Clark & Dieleman, 1996; Bolt et al., 2008). There are however some interesting differences in 
the mobility patterns between the two groups. The non-ethnic minority population (Table 2a) 
tend to either stay in neighbourhoods with a low percentage of ethnic minorities or leave 
neighbourhoods with high percentages of ethnic minorities. The ethnic minority population 
(Table 2b) tend to either stay in neighbourhoods with a high percentage of ethnic minorities or 
move to neighbourhoods with a high percentage of ethnic minorities. For example, of all non-
ethnic minorities previously in neighbourhoods with 20-40% ethnic minorities 57.3% move to 
neighbourhoods with lower concentrations of ethnic minorities, 30.7% move to similar 
neighbourhoods and 12.0% move to neighbourhoods with a higher percentage of ethnic 
minorities. Of all ethnic minorities previously in neighbourhoods with 20-40% ethnic 
minorities 29.8% move to neighbourhoods with lower concentrations of ethnic minorities, 
44.2% move to similar neighbourhoods and 26.0% move to neighbourhoods with a higher 
percentage of ethnic minorities. The origin and destination matrices suggest that the 
neighbourhood outcomes for ethnic and non-ethnic groups are very different. However, 
composition effects of the population might be responsible for these differences and therefore 
we need to control for socio-demographic and housing characteristics. 
 
--- Table 2a please around here --- 
 
--- Table 2b please around here --- 
 
Table 3 shows the results of an ordered logit regression, modelling destination neighbourhood 
ethnic minority concentration in six categories. The log likelihood of the model reported shows 
significant improvement compared to an intercept only model. The main variables of interest 
are a dummy indicating whether or not the household is categorised as belonging to an ethnic 
minority group and a dummy indicating whether or not the letting was made using the choice-
based letting system. The results show that, after controlling for all other variables in the 
model, ethnic minorities are significantly more likely than others to move to a neighbourhood 
with a high percentage of ethnic minorities. This result confirms the findings from Table 2a 
and 2b. The choice-based letting dummy is not significant, but the interaction effect between 
the choice-based letting dummy and the ethnic minority dummy is positive and significant. 
This indicates that ethnic minorities under choice-based letting are the most likely to move to 
neighbourhoods with a high percentage of ethnic minorities. 
 
--- Table 3 please around here --- 
 
The effects of the control variables in the model are as expected. With increasing age (for the 
head of household) households are less likely to move into neighbourhoods with a high 
percentage of ethnic minorities. The unemployed are more likely to enter neighbourhoods with 
higher percentages of ethnic minorities than the employed. Compared to households with two 
adults and no children, singles are more likely to move into neighbourhoods with higher 
percentages of ethnic minorities. Households new to the housing association sector are less 
likely to enter neighbourhoods with a high percentage of ethnic minorities than those moving 
within the sector. Households moving into a property let for the first time (a newly built 
property) are more likely to move into neighbourhoods with a high percentage of ethnic 
minorities than those moving into existing property. Households moving into supported 
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housing are also more likely to move into neighbourhoods with a higher percentage of ethnic 
minorities. Supported housing is provided to those people who, for various reasons, are 
regarded as the most vulnerable in society. The higher the number of bedrooms in the rented 
property, the less likely it is that households move into a neighbourhood with a high percentage 
of ethnic minorities. 
To control for local and regional differences in the structure of the housing market and 
for the fact that there are regional differences in ethnic minority concentrations and therefore in 
the probability to move into a neighbourhood with a high level of ethnic minorities we have 
included an additional set of dummies. The first set describes the level of urbanism of the 
spatial context of the destination Output Area. The results show that, as expected, moving into 
housing association property located in a city gives the highest probability to move into a 
neighbourhood with a high percentage of ethnic minorities. An additional dummy indicates 
whether households move into property located in London. The result show a positive London 
effect, reflecting the fact that London has the largest proportion of ethnic minorities in 
England. Finally, we included five dummies indicating the percentage of ethnic minorities in 
the Output Area of origin. These dummies control for what type of neighbourhood people were 
used to and control for characteristics of the local housing market. The results show that the 
higher the percentage of ethnic minorities in the origin neighbourhood, the higher the 
percentage of ethnic minorities in the destination neighbourhood. This result is in line with 
what we found in Tables 2a and 2b.  
Finally, to assess the size of the effects of belonging to an ethnic minority group, 
choice-based letting and the interaction effect between ethnicity and choice-based letting, we 
completed the regression equation for four theoretical households moving from a 
neighbourhood with 10-20% ethnic minorities: an ethnic minority household letting under 
choice-based letting; an ethnic minority household which is allocated a dwelling; a non-ethnic 
minority household which is allocated a dwelling; and a non-ethnic minority household letting 
under choice-based letting (Figure 1). All dummies except ethnicity and choice-based letting 
were set to the reference group (so scoring zero in the equation). Ethnicity and choice-based 
letting were varied depending on the household type in question. Age and the number of beds 
were given average values as reported in Table 1. As described in the data and method section, 
by using the raw output of the regression equation and the five cut points produced by the 
model it is possible to calculate the probability that a households moved into each of the six 
categories of destination neighbourhoods. As can be seen ethnic minorities (the two left hand 
side bars for each neighbourhood category) are less likely than non-ethnic minorities to move 
into neighbourhoods with less than 10% ethnic minorities and more likely to move into 
neighbourhoods with more than 10% ethnic minorities. The effect of choice-based letting is 
clearly different for ethnic minorities and non-ethnic minorities. For non-ethnic minorities 
there is no notable effect. For ethnic minorities, choice-based letting means that they are less 
likely to move into neighbourhoods with less than 10% ethnic minorities and more likely to 
move into neighbourhoods with more than 10% ethnic minorities.  
 
--- Figure 1 please around here --- 
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Conclusions  
 
This paper set out to investigate the effect of choice-based letting on (self) segregation in 
housing association stock in England. This study was motivated by the apparent contradiction 
in Government policies of creating socially and ethnically mixed neighbourhoods whilst giving 
people more choice in where and how they live. Following the Schelling (1969, 1971) inspired 
literature we hypothesised that choice-based letting increases the probability that ethnic 
minorities select themselves into ethnic concentration neighbourhoods. Additionally, we 
acknowledged several other mechanisms through which choice-based letting could lead to 
segregation. Previous work (CLG, 2006; Pawson & Watkins, 2007), based on a limited number 
of case studies, suggested that the introduction of choice-based letting has led to a stabilisation 
or even a slight decline of segregation. We argued that with households moving into and out of 
neighbourhoods all the time, processes of (self) segregation must be in place for the overall 
levels of segregation to stay the same.  
Based on an ordered logit regression model we showed that households belonging to an 
ethnic minority group are more likely to move into neighbourhoods with a high percentage of 
ethnic minorities than non-ethnic minority households. Ethnic minorities who rented their 
dwelling though the choice-based letting system were found to have the highest probability to 
move into ethnic concentration neighbourhoods. Although the effect of choice-based letting is 
relatively small, this effect can have relatively large consequences for aggregate segregation 
patterns. The fact that we found that choice-based letting reinforces the existing patterns of 
segregation contradicts the findings of the CLG (2006) report. It is debatable whether the 
effects found can be attributed to real choice based on a household’s preferences as discussed 
in the literature review (see Brown & King, 2005). Interestingly, we also found that even 
without choice-based letting, ethnic minorities are the most likely of all to move into ethnic 
concentration neighbourhoods. There are several possible explanations for this. First, the 
results might reflect local demographic and housing market structures which we have not been 
able to fully control for in our model. Second, tenants still have limited choice using traditional 
allocation systems, as they have the option to refuse an offer. Third, ethnic minorities are more 
likely than others to have urgent housing needs and lack knowledge about alternative housing 
options. If real choice is absent under choice-based letting this may lead to selection into ethnic 
concentration neighbourhoods without applicants having a preference for such 
neighbourhoods. 
Our data represented virtually all lettings made in housing association properties in 
2006/2007 in England. Because we use dynamic flow data we can not comment on changes in 
overall levels of segregation in neighbourhoods. In England, the 2011 Census will be the next 
opportunity to nationally evaluate changes in segregation levels. In order to fully understand 
dynamic processes leading to (changes in) segregation, a full set of dynamic flow data on the 
level of neighbourhoods is needed, including information on households moving into and out 
of neighbourhoods. Only by using such information it is possible to assess to what extent 
choice-based letting contributes to overall levels of segregation. In-depth qualitative analysis is 
needed to assess whether any effects of choice-based letting on overall levels of segregation 
can be attributed to real choice based on preferences.  
Based on the results presented in this paper it can be concluded that choice in where to 
live through choice-based letting contributes to the segregation of ethnic minority groups. 
Combining aims to create mixed communities and at the same time give people more choice 
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will most likely require continuous and active policy intervention. It has been argued that the 
traditional allocation system gave policy makers more opportunities for steering households 
with certain characteristics into certain neighbourhoods than the new choice-based letting 
system (Van Kempen & Idamir, 2003). A paper by Van Daalen and Van der Land (2008) on 
the future of choice-based lettings in the Netherlands signals that there is a need to adapt the 
current choice-based allocation system to change disadvantaged neighbourhoods into 
sustainable communities. One potential solution is a form of community lettings which seeks 
to influence the socio-economic and demographic composition of neighbourhoods through 
lettings by actively discouraging or preventing lets to certain ethnic or socio-economic groups 
(Pawson & Kintrea, 2002). Such letting models based on neighbourhood and applicant 
profiling has been extensively used to create more mixed neighbourhoods in the Netherlands 
and especially in the city of Rotterdam (Bolt et al., 2008) but have not been extensively 
adopted in England (see Griffiths et al., 1996). Although a potential solution, the community 
letting model brings up images of social engineering not everyone is comfortable with.  
The whole discussion surrounding the creation of mixed neighbourhoods originates 
from the assumption that residential segregation is negative. Drever (2004) found for Germany 
that this is not necessarily the case. She identified that segregation was not a barrier to inter-
community integration between minority groups and the majority German population. It has 
also been identified that segregation can have major positive effects for ethnic minorities living 
in ethnic concentration neighbourhoods (Cheshire, 2008). Creating mixed neighbourhoods 
might therefore not be the Holy Grail in preventing the negative effects of spatial community 
fragmentation. The consequences of forcing socio-economic and ethnic groups to mix in 
neighbourhoods, against mechanisms of residents’ preferences, could create community 
tension and destabilise communities and neighbourhoods. 
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Table 1: Variable summary statistics (N = 122,259). 
Source: CORE, 2006/2007 (own calculations) 
 
Variables % 
Dependent variable (percentage ethnic minorities in 
destination neighbourhood) 
 
  1: 0 to 2.5 % 45.81 
  2: 2.5 to 5 % 17.56 
  3: 5 to 10 % 12.87 
  4: 10 to 20 % 8.73 
  5: 20 to 40 % 8.24 
  6: 40 to 100 % 6.79 
   
Independent variables   
Ethnic Minority (ref = not ethnic minority) 14.68 
Economic Activity   
  Employed 28.95 
  Unemployed  32.68 
  Other Economic Activity  38.37 
Household type   
  Single 53.72 
  Single Parent 18.29 
  Two Adults Household with Children 11.49 
  Two Adults without Children (reference) 11.02 
  Other Household 5.48 
Supported Housing (ref = not Supported Housing) 25.54 
Choice-based letting (ref = other allocation system) 23.20 
New Tenant (ref = existing tenant) 56.31 
New Let (ref = relet) 10.25 
Urbanism of destination neighbourhood   
  Urban 87.13 
  Small Town 8.38 
  Villages 3.87 
  Dispersed 0.62 
Destination neighbourhood London (ref= outside London) 10.22 
Percentage ethnic minorities in origin Neighbourhood    
  0 to 2.5 44.85 
  2.5 to 5 % 17.31 
  5 to 10 % 12.53 
  10 to 20 % 8.77 
  20 to 40% 8.41 
  40 to 100 % 8.13 
 Mean 
Age  43.75 (range 15 to 106) 
Beds 1.89 (range 1 to 7) 
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Table 2a: Crosstabulation of origin and destination neighbourhood percentage ethnic minorities for all non ethnic minority lettings. 
 Destination Neighbourhood percentage ethnic minorities 
 0 to 2.5 2.5 to 5 5 to 10 10 to 20 20 to 40 40 to 100 N 
Origin Neighbourhood 
percentage 
ethnic minorities 
0 to 2.5 72.5 16.6 6.8 2.4 1.1 0.5 53,282 
2.5 to 5 45.5 31.0 14.2 5.5 2.4 1.3 19,878 
5 to 10 28.2 21.1 31.2 12.3 4.5 2.7 13,467 
10 to 20 17.3 15.3 22.2 28.3 11.6 5.3 8,061 
20 to 40 13.0 10.1 14.9 19.2 30.7 12.0 5,825 
40 to 100 11.6 8.3 12.1 14.0 21.5 32.5 3,747 
 N 54,081 19,990 13,776 7,953 5,222 3,238 104,260 
Source: CORE, 2006/2007 (own calculations) 
 
Table 2b: Crosstabulation of origin and destination neighbourhood ethnicity for all ethnic minority lettings. 
 Destination Neighbourhood percentage ethnic minorities 
 0 to 2.5 2.5 to 5 5 to 10 10 to 20 20 to 40 40 to 100 N 
Origin Neighbourhood 
percentage 
ethnic minorities 
0 to 2.5 55.9 20.3 11.7 4.8 4.4 2.9 1,732 
2.5 to 5 29.6 26.1 19.1 10.9 8.6 5.7 1,307 
5 to 10 13.9 14.5 29.0 18.7 14.2 9.8 1,875 
10 to 20 5.8 8.3 15.5 29.3 26.1 15.0 2,648 
20 to 40 2.7 3.3 7.7 16.2 44.2 26.0 4,358 
40 to 100 1.5 2.8 4.6 10.8 28.3 52.1 6,079 
 N 1,975 1,497 2,015 2,713 4,791 5,008 17,999 
Source: CORE, 2006/2007 (own calculations) 
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Table 3: Ordered logit regression of destination neighbourhood ethnic minority concentration 
in six categories (1: 0 to 2.5%; 2: 2.5 to 5%; 3: 5 to 10%; 4: 10 to 20%; 5: 20 to 40% and 6: 40 
to 100%). 
 Coef. S.e Sig 
Ethnic Minority (ref = not ethnic minority) 0.827 0.029 *** 
Choice-based letting (ref = all other allocation systems) -0.015 0.032  
Interaction CBL*Ethnic 0.146 0.060 *** 
    
Age  -0.010 0.001 *** 
Economic Activity (ref = employed)    
  Unemployed  0.053 0.019 *** 
  Other   -0.074 0.024 *** 
Household type (ref = two adults)    
  Single 0.144 0.025 *** 
  Single Parent -0.002 0.039  
  Two Adults + child(ren)  0.009 0.037  
  Other household 0.177 0.039 *** 
New Tenant (ref = existing tenant) -0.038 0.016 ** 
New Let (ref = relet) 0.223 0.055 *** 
Supported Housing (ref = not Supported Housing) 0.239 0.055 *** 
Number of Bedrooms -0.097 0.020 *** 
Urbanism of destination neighbourhood (ref Cities)    
  Small Town -1.321 0.066 *** 
  Villages -1.827 0.099 *** 
  Dispersed -1.218 0.230 *** 
Destination neighbourhood in London (ref = outside London) 1.157 0.056 *** 
Percentage ethnic minorities in origin Neighbh (ref = 0 to 2.5)    
  2.5 to 5 % 0.958 0.021 *** 
  5 to 10 % 1.743 0.027 *** 
  10 to 20 % 2.444 0.034 *** 
  20 to 40 % 3.035 0.047 *** 
  40 to 100 % 3.838 0.050 *** 
    
Cut point 1 0.244 0.062  
Cut point 2 1.394 0.064  
Cut point 3 2.510 0.069  
Cut point 4 3.555 0.076  
Cut point 5 4.923 0.089  
    
N 121,065   
Wald (df) 15,416 (23)  
Log pseudolikelihood (initial value = -192,287) -164,423   
** = p < 0.05, *** = p < 0.001 
Source: CORE, 2006/2007 (own calculations) 
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Figure 1: Estimated probabilities of moving to six types of neighbourhoods for four categories 
of household coming from neighbourhoods with 10-20% ethnic minorities. 
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